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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
Returning to the situation in Illinois, it is apparent that the provision
to be found there for service is deficient for it merely provides for substi-
tute personal service on the non-resident motorist himself,3 0 so could not,
under fundamental canons of statutory interpretation, be construed to
extend to cover service on the foreign personal representative. The re-
sult is that, for the moment, there is no available remedy in an Illinois
state court for a person injured within the state as the result of an
automobile collision with a non-resident motorist if the latter has no prop-
erty in the state and has died prior to the commencement of suit or serv-
ice of process. The defect is one which should be remedied promptly.
True, there has been some conflict of authority and reasoning on the point
as to the validity of these corrective statutes but some influential state
supreme courts have found no serious objection to be present. Until there
is a decision on the point by the United States Supreme Court there can,
of course, be no really settled law but one may hazard a guess that, when
that court is provided with an opportunity to pass directly on the ques-
tion, it could well arrive at the conclusion that there is no basic weakness
in provisions of the type here discussed.3 1
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DIVORCE--FREIGN DIVORCES-WHETHER OR NOT ILLINOIS COURTS WILL
DIRECTLY ENFORCE A FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE WITH RESPECT TIYo FUTURE
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS-An interesting ramification in-
volving the application of the full faith and credit clause to a foreign di-
vorce decree developed in the recent case of Light v. Light.' The plain-
tiff therein had been granted a divorce from the defendant by a Missouri
court. That decree allowed her custody of a minor child, child support and
alimony. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a petition in Illinois requesting
that the Missouri decree be registered, under the terms of the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,2 as an Illinois judgment. The
defendant was personally served with a summons in this action. As part
of his defense, he insisted that the court was empowered by the act to give
effect to the judgment only to the extent that liability had already accrued,
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 2, Ch. 95J, § 9-301. It has, however, been interpreted
to apply to the principal of a driver-agent, even though the principal himself has
not personally used the state highway: Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill. 309, 20 N. E. (2d)
592, 125 A. L. R. 451 (1939).
31 See the case of Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338, 74 S. Ct. 83,
98 L. Ed. 39 (1953), for emphasis on the fact that the federal supreme court has
apparently turned to the concept of "power," rather than "consent," in matters of
this nature.
112 Ill. (2d) 502, 147 N. E. (2d) 34 (1958).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 2, Ch. 77, § 88 et seq.
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to-wit, alimony and support payments in arrears.3 The lower court granted
the requested relief to the extent of arrearages, but refused to validate
the Missouri decree with respect to future installments of child support
and alimony. On a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, 4 the
decision was reversed and the cause remanded with directions to register
and give effect to the entire decree since the court concluded that full
faith and credit5 should be given with respect to future installments of
alimony and child support.6
As a general proposition, courts have been enforcing foreign divorce
decrees only to the extent that liability has already accrued. They have
been reluctant to give full faith and credit with respect to future liability.
This reluctance has been justified on the grounds that such decrees, being
subject to modification, were not final and also that the courts of equity
had not been empowered to enforce them. The latter justification rests
upon two grounds, namely, that a judgment for alimony is enforcible in
an action of debt with an adequate legal remedy, and that equity courts
have no general powers over divorce and related matters unless they are
expressly conferred by statute. However, a number of jurisdictions have
enforced such payments even though they took the position that the
judgments were not entitled to full faith and credit.7  These courts felt
that comity among the states required enforcement and accomplished this
by adopting the foreign decree as that of the forum and enforcing it
as such.
Until the instant decision, the Illinois law was unsettled as to enforce-
ment of future payments of alimony and child support. Originally, the
Illinois courts held that, in a judgment for money in installments, the right
of action accrued on each installment only after it had fallen due.s Later,
in the case of Rule v. Rule,9 the Appellate Court for the Second District
of Illinois held that full faith and credit applied to future payments
ordered by a foreign judgment and were, therefore, enforcible in equity.
That court's answer to the question of modification was that if the render-
3 Other defenses were raised, but they are not pertinent to this discussion.
4 Direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court is authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75, where a constitutional question is presented by the case.
5 U. S. Const., Art. 4, § 1. This clause governs the decision in the instant case due
to the fact that Section 1(a) of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act adopts the full faith and credit clause as the criterion for determining what
foreign judgments may be registered and enforced. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957,
Vol. 2, Ch. 77, § 88(a).
6 A like result appears to have since been reached in the case of Reinhard v.
Reinhard, 19 Ill. App. (2d) 223, 153 N. E. (2d) 285 (1958), abst. opin.
7 See annotation with respect thereto in 18 A. L. R. (2d) 873 and cases there
cited.
8 Schuler v. Schuler, 209 Ill. 522, 71 N. E. 16 (1904) ; Dow v. Blake, 148 Ill. 76,
35 N. E. 761 (1893).
9 313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N. E. (2d) 379 (1942).
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ing court modified the decree, the Illinois court could modify its decree
accordingly. Thereafter, in an action to enforce future payments ordered
under an English judgment,10 the Illinois Supreme Court determined,
among other things, that no Illinois statute conferred specific authority on
equity courts to enforce divorce decrees of another jurisdiction. Relying
on that decision as to the authority of equity courts, the Appellate Court
for the Third District of Illinois, in the similar case of Tailby v. Tailby,"
entered judgment only for the installments then due. However, when
the question arose again, in the Appellate Court of the First District, that
court, acknowledging that the prior decisions were not in harmony, ordered
that the foreign decree be adopted as an Illinois judgment and enforced
by equitable remedies as though it had been originally entered in this
state.12  The assigned ground was that an alimony and support decree
represented more than a debt because its basis is the natural obligation of
a husband to support his wife and children, and to do otherwise than
enforce its payment would be to disregard the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution.
Those courts originally denying enforcement of a modifiable foreign
decree partially predicated their decision upon one practical procedural
problem. The parties to the decree were entitled, by its very terms, to
its modification if the circumstances warranted. But it was heretofore
an open question as to whether a petition for such modification could be
entertained by the tribunal requested to enforce its provisions or whether
the parties would be forced to return to the court that originally rendered
the decree. The present decision answers this question by accepting a solu-
tion formulated by a California court 13 which concluded that the forum
had the power to litigate any issue of modification, raised by either party,
after it had adopted the foreign decree as its own. While the latter
proceeding was in equity, the Illinois court appeared to accept it as
equally applicable to proceedings arising under the Uniform Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments Act.
The holding in the instant case not only harmonizes the Illinois law
with respect to enforcement of future payments of alimony and child
support decreed by a sister state, but also makes it clear that finality of
such a decree is not a prerequisite to giving it full faith and credit. Thus,
this determination would seem to point the way to giving the full faith
and credit clause the standing to which it is rightfully entitled. And,
without regard to its legal connotations, it assuages a troublesome area of
the law with a certainty that is socially desirable.
MRS. M. HEINDL
lo Clubb v. Clubb, 402 I1. 390, 84 N. E. (2d) 366 (1949).
"1342 Ill. App. 664, 97 N. E. (2d) 611 (1951).
12 See Roberts v. Roberts, 11 Ill. App. (2d) 86, 136 N. E. (2d) 590 (1956).
13 Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. (2d) 465, 283 P. 19 (1955).
